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what is gained by calling a presumption "evidence" or "in the nature of
evidence," and what effect the presumption should have upon the burden
of coming forward with the evidence and upon the ultimate burden of
proof. If the Court were to conclude that no single rule could be applied
to all presumptions, a statement to that effect would be helpful. A defi-
nite commitment by the Supreme Court of Ohio would obviate much of
the misunderstanding which now obtains in the field of presumptions.
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EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The defendant was charged with a violation of Ohio G. C. sec.
6296-3o by operating a motor vehicle while in a state of intoxication or
under the influence of alcohol. He refused to submit to a blood test or
urinalysis to determine the amount of alcohol in his system. The Court
of Appeals for Wayne County said that since the privilege against self-
incrimination as guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution applies only to dis-
closure by utterance, evidence of the demand and refusal was admissible
and there was no error in permitting the prosecutor to urge the refusal
as an inference of the guilt of the defendant. State v. Gatton, 6o Ohio
App. 192, 14 Ohio 0. 2o (1938).
Art. I, sec. Io of the Ohio Constitution as amended in 1912 pro-
vides, . . . "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; but his failure to testify may be considered by
the court and jury and may be the subject of comment by counsel. .. ."
Ohio G. C. sec. 13444-3 provides that a criminal defendant ". . . may
at his own request be a witness but not otherwise. . . ." The result is
that the state may comment on the failure of the defendant to testify
but would not be permitted to call him to the stand and force him to
claim the privilege. Practically all states have constitutional provisions
giving the defendant a privilege but very few authorize comment by the
prosecution. (See Calif. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 as amended in 1934).
In the principal case the comment by the state upon the defendant's
failure to submit to these tests before trial would be meaningless unless
it was first shown that the defendant was asked to submit to the tests
and refused to do so. Would this be similar to an attempt by the state
to call the defendant to the stand in order to force him to claim his
privilege? Or would there be any violation of the privilege if these
tests had been made against the will of the defendant? The holding of
the court here is that "the privilege against self-incrimination . . . ap-
plies only to disclosure by utterance, oral or written." This position has
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the vigorous support of Mr. Wigmore. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1923) sec. 2265. Historically, it is clearly sound. The privilege was
created to prevent the defendant from being forced to convict himself
out of his own mouth. But constitutional provisions, usually brief, "shall
not be compelled to testify," "shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself," may be construed strictly or broadly and some writers
have favored a construction more favorable to the defendant. 3 JONES,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, sec. 1391 (1926).
A majority of the cases agree with the position taken by this court
and by Mr. WNigmore. Thus it has been held no violation of the privi-
lege.- to have defendant stand up in court for identification by a wit-
ness, State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. I8 (930); Coles v.
State, 3 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 420 (I9OI); or for observation by witnesses
or jurors, Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, I N.E. (2d) 189 (Mass.,
1936); Lindsey v. State, 4 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 409, 14 Ohio C.D. 1,
aff'd in 69 Ohio St. 215, 69 N.E. 126 (1903); to require defendant to
write his name on cross examination, Hall v. State, 171 Ark. 787, 286
S.W. IO26 (1926); to procure defendant's signature by trick, Lefkovitz
v. United States Attorney, etc., 52 Fed. (2d) 52 (1931); to have officer
place a handkerchief over accused's face in identification before trial,
and to compel the growth of a beard, Ross V. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182
N.E. 865 (1932); to compel defendant to remove his coat so that jury
might see scars on his body, State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582
(1926); to admit X-ray pictures of defendant's wounded arm, State v.
Casey, io8 Or. 386, 213 Pac. 771 (1923); to admit a photograph of
defendant taken immediately after the arrest, to aid in identification,
Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 417 (1904); to admit evidence
of scrapings taken from under the fingernails of the accused to test for
human blood, State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958, 70 So. 925 (1926);
to compel the accused to unwrap a bandaged hand claimed to have been
burned, State v. Garrett, 71 N. Car. 85 (1874); to compel the de-
fendant to put on his cap for identification before arrest, Crenshaw v.
State, 255 Ala. 346, 142 So. 669 (1932); to compel the defendant to
put on an overcoat found in his room to assist in identification, Richard-
son v. State, 168 Miss. 788, 151 So. 910 (1934); or to examine the
accused against her will to determine pregnancy, Villaflor v. Summers,
41 Phil. Is. 62 (1920).
On the other hand, it has been held a violation of the privilege: to
compel the defendant to stand up in court to enable a witness to testify
whether his size and build correspond to the man who was involved in
a burglary, Vells v. State, 2o Ala. App. 240, IOI So. 624 (1924) ; to
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compel the defendant to take dictation in writing (even when on the
stand) in falsification case, Beltran v. Sampson and Jose, 53 Phil. Is. 570
(1929); to compel the defendant to put on a coat found at the scene of
the crime (when defendant had taken the stand), Ward v. State, 27
Okla. Crim. Rep. 362, 228 Pac. 498 (1924); to compel the defendant
to don a cap in the presence of the jury, Tierman v. State, 50 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 7, 95 S.W. 533 (i9o6), disapproved in Rutherford v. State, 121
S.W. (2d) 342 (Tex. Cr. App., 1939), where requiring defendant to
stand and remove his glasses was held admissible; to compel defendant
to display an amputated leg, Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 44 Am. Rep.
717 (i88i); to compel defendant to place his foot in a pan of mud
placed before the jury so that the tracks so made could be compared with
measurements of tracks found at the scene of the crime, Stokes v. State,
5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619, 30 Am. Rep. 72 (875); to examine defendant
against her will to find out whether she recently gave birth to a child,
State v. Kowalewsky, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 612 (I937); and People v.
McCoy, 45 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 216 (873), apparently regarded
as overruled in People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 36
N.Y. Crim. Rep. 27 (1917).
The same confusion exists in cases where there is a group of cases in-
volving acts of the same kind. It has generally been held no violation of
the constitutional immunity: to permit the taking of the shoes of the ac-
cused for comparison with tracks made at the scene of the crime, Biggs v.
State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N.E. 129, 64 A.L.R. io85 (1929); State v.
Griffin, 12 9 S. Car. 200, 124 S.E. 8i, 35 A.L.R. 1227 (1927); to
permit measurements of accused's shoes and feet, State v. Smith, 133
S. Car. 291, 130 S.E. 884 (1925); and to force the accused to make
new tracks for comparison, State v. Barela, 23 N. Mex. 395, 168 Pac.
545 (1917). A few courts have held to the contrary. South Carolina
has taken the anomalous view that an officer may take shoes from the
accused for purposes of comparison but cannot force the accused to put
his foot in the track. State v. Smith, supra. Of particular interest be-
cause of the approach made in the principal case are decisions excluding
evidence of the refusal of the defendant to make tracks. Cooper v. State,
86 Ala. 6Io, 6 So. rio (I888); State v. Griffin, supra; and contra,
State v. McKowen, 126 La. 1075, 53 So. 353 (1910)- The state
that allowed the evidence itself to come in also allowed the evidence of
the refusal. In Elder v. State, 143 Ga. 363, 85 S.E. 97 (915), it was
held error to forcibly take defendant's shoes from him for comparison.
In the field of fingerprinting there is more unanimity in the decis-
ions. Many courts assume that such evidence is admissible, but some-
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times the issue is contested, though usually with no finding of a violation
of the immunity. United States v. Kelly, 55 Fed. (2d) 67, 83 A.L.R.
122 (1922); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 Ad. 17
(1930). A dissent was registered by People v. Hevern, 127 Misc. 14I,
215 N. Y. S. 412 (1926), where the City Magistrate said that finger-
printing before conviction "involves prohibited compulsory incrimina-
tion." In 1928 a statute was passed in New York ordering police to take
fingerprints in certain arrests but allowing use of the fingerprints only
after defendant has been found guilty (Tide X of the Code of Crim.
Proc.). The weight of this county court decision is not so strong in view
of Schmidt v. District Attorney of Monroe County, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
787 (1938) expressly adopting the Wigmore approach in an intoxica-
tion case.
In cases involving venereal disease as a link connecting a defendant
with a crime it is difficult to generalize on the effect of the privilege
against self-incrimination because so many cases have found a waiver
and so have not considered the problem of what the decision would have
been if the examination had been compulsory. Garcia v. State, 35 Ariz.
35, 274 Pac. 166 (1929); People v. Guiterey, 126 Cal. App. 526, 14
Pac. (2d) 838 (1932). Numerous cases have excluded such evidence
on the basis of compulsion. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 65o, 91 N.W.
935, 59 L.R.A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323 (1902); Commonwealth v.
Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 Ad. 828 (1922); State v. Horton, 247
Mo. 657, 153 S.V. 1051 (1913). In People v. Corder, 224 Mich.
274, 221 N.W. 309 (1928), a divided court held that it was necessary
to have an affirmative expression of consent before there could be a
waiver of the constitutional immunity. Ohio assumes that the examina-
tion was voluntary in the absence of a showing to the contrary. .4ngeloff
v. State, 91 Ohio St. 361, iO N.E. 936 (1914); Lindsey v. State,
supra. But in Jones v. State, 20 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 542, 31 Ohio C.D.
419 (1905), the court did say that if the examination was not volun-
tary, the evidence would be inadmissible.
Contrary decisions supporting the Wigmore approach may be found.
United States v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. Is. 145 (1912); Territory of
Hawaii v. Chung Ming (dictum), 21 Hawaii 214 (1912). In many
cases the question is confused with the question of undue prejudice or
materiality. Bethel et al. v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S.W. (2d) 370,
21 S.W. (2d) 176 (1928). Sometimes emphasis is placed on modesty
or possible indignities. Anonymous, 34 Misc. io9, 69 N.Y.S. 547, 9
N. Y. Anno. Cas. 438 (19O1); State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33
Am. Rep. 530 (1879); State v. Height, supra.
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While discussion of the problem of self-incrimination involved is
rare, the substantial weight of authority favors admissibility on the issue
of insanity of evidence obtained from an examination of the defendant
without his consent by physicians or insanity experts. Blocker v. State,
92 Fla. 878, 11O So. 547 (1926); Noelke v. State, 15 N.E. (2d) 950
(Ind., 1938); Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E.
463 (I935); Jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634, 71
A.L.R. 1005 (1930); State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655
(1927); contra, People v. Scott, 326 Il. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927);
People v. Lamey, 103 Cal. App. 66, 283 Pac. 848 (I930).
The cases involving the admissibility of compulsory blood tests or
urinalyses to determine intoxication are comparatively recent and the
majority of the few cases have held the evidence admissible. People v.
Dennis, 132 Misc. 40, 230 N.Y.S. 510 (1928), reversing People v.
Dennis, 131 Misc. 62, 226 N.Y.S. 689 (1928); contra, Booker v.
Cincinnati, 5 Ohio 0. 433, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 286 (1936), where the
court said that compulsory urinalysis was inadmissible but that in view
of the other evidence there was no error. In State v. Duguid, 50 Ariz.
276, 72 Pac. (2d) 435 (I937) and in Schmidt v. District Attorney
of Monroe County, supra, the courts found a waiver but definitely indi-
cated that the privilege was not properly involved. In Noe v. Mon-
mouth County Common Pleas Court, 6 N. J. Misc. 1o6, 143 Ad.
750, aff'd in io6 N.J.L. 584, 150 Ad. 920 (1928) an examination
(though what kind does not appear) by a physician in an intoxication
case was held admissible.
The tendency in recent years has been to construe the privilege
against self-incrimination strictly. The privilege keeps out relevant evi-
dence and there seems little justification for broadening its effect by an
excess of sentimentalism. The privilege was originally intended to cover
testimonial utterances only and there is ample support in principle and
authority for confining it to that field. The result reached in the prin-
cipal case seems dearly justifiable. Any other result would involve an
unnecessary broadening of the privilege as well as an extremely technical
construction of the Ohio constitutional provision.
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